Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Discharge Guide 2026: The §523(a)(8) Framework, Homaidan-McDaniel-Thomas Circuit Line, Brunner Undue Hardship Test, Adversary Proceedings, and Ascent’s 2023 Waiver

Informational content only. Not legal, tax, or financial advice. Private Student Relief is a consulting organization, not a law firm. Debt validation services are executed by an attorney-backed partner provider. Individual results vary by lender, loan terms, state law, and borrower circumstances. Last reviewed: August 2026.

The widespread narrative that private student loans “cannot be discharged in bankruptcy” is substantially wrong. Under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8), only three specific categories of educational debt are excepted from ordinary bankruptcy discharge — and the Second Circuit’s 2021 decision in Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, followed by parallel Tenth Circuit (2020) and Fifth Circuit (2019) rulings, established that many private student loans do not fall within the “educational benefit” category at all. Where §523(a)(8) does apply, the Brunner test’s undue hardship standard is not the impossible barrier that lender narratives suggest. And Ascent’s June 5, 2023 announcement — that Ascent college loans originated on or after that date are eligible for discharge without any undue hardship showing — demonstrates that industry practice itself is shifting toward more borrower-favorable dischargeability standards. This guide explains the framework, the Homaidan line of cases, the Brunner and totality-of-circumstances tests, the adversary proceeding process, and lender-specific considerations in 2026.

Bankruptcy discharge framework and the three §523(a)(8) categories

Bankruptcy discharge is the fundamental relief the Bankruptcy Code provides to consumer debtors — an order of the court releasing the debtor from personal liability on discharged debts and prohibiting creditors from taking any collection action on those debts. Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, discharge is generally available at the conclusion of the case after liquidation of non-exempt assets. Under Chapter 13, discharge is available upon completion of the debtor’s payment plan (typically three to five years). However, 11 U.S.C. §523(a) contains a series of exceptions from discharge — categories of debt that survive the discharge and remain the debtor’s personal obligation post-bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(8) is the specific exception addressing student loan and educational debt. As originally enacted and as amended through the current version, §523(a)(8) creates three distinct categories of nondischargeable educational debt. Understanding which category (if any) applies to a specific loan is the first and most important analytical step in evaluating discharge options.

Category (A)(i) — governmental unit and program-funded loans

The first category, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)(A)(i), covers “an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution.” This category encompasses essentially all federal student loans (Direct Loans, Direct PLUS Loans, Direct Consolidation Loans, legacy FFEL Program loans, Perkins loans) and loans made through programs jointly funded by governmental units or nonprofit institutions. This category is broad and is where most federal loans clearly fall.

Category (A)(ii) — educational benefit obligations

The second category, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)(A)(ii), covers “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.” This category was historically interpreted by some lenders and courts as encompassing broadly any private student loan on the theory that a loan for education is an “obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit.” The Homaidan-McDaniel-Thomas line of circuit court decisions has substantially narrowed this interpretation, holding that private student loans of the ordinary consumer credit type do NOT fall within this category — the section 4 discussion below addresses these decisions in detail.

Category (B) — qualified education loans

The third category, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)(B), covers “any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual.” This category was added by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) and extended §523(a)(8) coverage to private student loans that meet the specific “qualified education loan” definition. Where a private student loan falls within §523(a)(8)(B), discharge requires an adversary proceeding and proof of undue hardship under the applicable circuit’s test. Where the loan does NOT meet the qualified education loan definition, §523(a)(8)(B) does not apply and — if categories (A)(i) and (A)(ii) also do not apply — the loan is dischargeable under ordinary Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 discharge without any hardship showing.

Homaidan, McDaniel, Thomas — private loans and §523(a)(8)(A)(ii)

The most significant development in private student loan bankruptcy dischargeability in the past decade is the Homaidan-McDaniel-Thomas line of circuit court decisions. These cases collectively established that many private student loans do not fall within the §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) “educational benefit” category and therefore may be discharged in ordinary Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy without any undue hardship showing — an outcome that directly contradicts the widespread narrative that private student loans are effectively non-dischargeable.

In re Thomas (5th Cir. 2019) — the initial breakthrough

In Thomas v. Department of Education (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2019), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the term “educational benefit” as used in §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) draws meaning from the surrounding terms — “scholarship” and “stipend” — and cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include ordinary private educational loans. The court applied traditional canons of statutory construction (noscitur a sociis — a word is known by the company it keeps) to conclude that the three terms in the phrase “educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend” share a common characteristic of conditional grants that may or may not need to be repaid depending on the recipient’s satisfaction of conditions (for example, service obligations, academic performance requirements, or continued enrollment). An ordinary private student loan — a straightforward obligation to repay borrowed funds with interest — does not share this conditional-grant characteristic.

In re McDaniel (10th Cir. 2020) — the second circuit adoption

The following year, in McDaniel v. Navient Solutions, LLC (In re McDaniel), 973 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2020), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion using similar statutory construction reasoning. The Tenth Circuit expressly noted that Congress had used the term “loan” separately in §523(a)(8) — specifically in §523(a)(8)(A)(i) covering governmental unit loans and in §523(a)(8)(B) covering qualified education loans — and would have used the same term in §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) if Congress had intended that provision to cover ordinary loans. The absence of the word “loan” in §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) reflected Congress’s intent to limit that subsection to obligations arising from educational benefits, scholarships, and stipends rather than from ordinary loans.

Homaidan v. Sallie Mae (2d Cir. 2021) — the Second Circuit joins

On July 15, 2021, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 3 F.4th 595 (2d Cir. 2021), joining the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in holding that private student loans of the ordinary consumer credit type do not fall within the §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) educational benefit category. The debtor, Hilal K. Homaidan, was an Emerson College alumnus who had received a Chapter 7 discharge and then reopened his bankruptcy case through an adversary proceeding against Navient after Navient continued collection efforts on private student loans totaling $12,567 that Homaidan argued had been discharged. The bankruptcy court sided with Homaidan; Navient appealed; the Second Circuit affirmed.

The Second Circuit’s opinion, authored by Circuit Court Judge Dennis Jacobs, followed the statutory construction reasoning from Thomas and McDaniel. The court identified three categories of educational debt that cannot be discharged under §523(a)(8): “(1) loans and benefit overpayments backed by the government or a nonprofit; (2) obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; and (3) qualified private educational loans.” The court held that Navient’s interpretation — that any private educational loan constitutes an “obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit” under category (2) — violated multiple canons of statutory construction. In particular, characterizing a loan as “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit” was, as the bankruptcy court had observed, “an unconventional way to discuss a loan.” Congress had used the specific term “loan” in other subsections of §523(a)(8), and its choice not to use that term in §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) was meaningful.

The remand — analysis under §523(a)(8)(B) still required

The Second Circuit’s decision in Homaidan resolved the §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) question but did not fully resolve the case. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to consider whether the private student loans at issue were “qualified education loans” and thus not subject to discharge under §523(a)(8)(B). This remand illustrates a critical procedural point: even after Homaidan, a private student loan borrower seeking discharge cannot rely on the (A)(ii) analysis alone — the (B) analysis under the qualified education loan definition remains a separate barrier that must also be overcome.

The Homaidan class action and 2022 settlement

Homaidan’s underlying adversary proceeding was structured as a class action on behalf of all similarly situated Sallie Mae and Navient borrowers whose private educational loans had been discharged and were subsequently subject to continued collection efforts. In 2022, the parties reached a class action settlement in which Navient agreed to cancel approximately $1.7 billion in private student loans held by class members and to pay additional monetary relief. The settlement addressed the specific loans that were subject to the Homaidan analytical framework — private loans that had been made in excess of the school’s certified cost of attendance, or made to attend non-Title-IV-eligible institutions, categories where the loans could not qualify as “qualified education loans” under §523(a)(8)(B).

Qualified education loan analysis under §523(a)(8)(B) and IRC §221(d)(1)

Because the Homaidan line has largely eliminated §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) as a barrier to discharge for most ordinary private student loans, the operative barrier in most cases is now §523(a)(8)(B) — the qualified education loan provision. Whether a specific private student loan meets the “qualified education loan” definition determines whether the borrower must prove undue hardship at all to discharge it.

The IRC §221(d)(1) definition

Section 523(a)(8)(B) incorporates the “qualified education loan” definition from Internal Revenue Code §221(d)(1), which was originally written to determine eligibility for the student loan interest deduction on federal income tax returns. The definition requires that the loan meet several specific criteria: (1) the loan must be incurred solely to pay qualified higher education expenses; (2) the qualified higher education expenses must be paid or incurred within a reasonable period of time before or after the loan is incurred; (3) the qualified higher education expenses must be attributable to education furnished during a period during which the recipient was an eligible student; and (4) the qualified higher education expenses must be attributable to education furnished at an eligible educational institution.

Loans that may not qualify

Categories of private student loans that may not meet the qualified education loan definition include: (1) loans exceeding the school’s certified cost of attendance — the portion of the loan that exceeds the certified cost may not have been “solely to pay qualified higher education expenses” because it necessarily funded non-qualified expenses; (2) loans made to attend institutions that are not “eligible educational institutions” under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (institutions that do not participate in the federal Direct Loan Program or other Title IV programs); (3) loans made to students who did not meet the “eligible student” definition at the time of the loan (for example, students enrolled less than half-time, or students not making satisfactory academic progress); (4) bar exam or medical residency loans made after the borrower had completed the underlying degree; and (5) K-12 loans, career training loans for non-degree programs, and loans for continuing education that do not fit within the qualified higher education expense framework.

Where a private student loan does not meet the qualified education loan definition under IRC §221(d)(1) and does not fall within §523(a)(8)(A)(i) (governmental/program-funded) or §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) (educational benefit — per Homaidan line), the loan is treated like an ordinary consumer debt (credit card, medical bill) and is discharged under the ordinary Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 discharge order without any undue hardship showing and without an adversary proceeding. This is the pathway that produced the substantial Homaidan-Navient 2022 class settlement covering approximately $1.7 billion in loans.

The Brunner three-prong undue hardship test

Where a student loan does fall within one of the §523(a)(8) categories — most importantly, where a private student loan qualifies as a “qualified education loan” under §523(a)(8)(B) — discharge requires the debtor to prove undue hardship. The Bankruptcy Code does not define “undue hardship,” and federal courts have developed two competing tests to apply the standard. The majority of federal circuits use the three-prong Brunner test.

The origin of the Brunner test

The Brunner test comes from Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987), a Second Circuit decision that affirmed a bankruptcy court’s denial of discharge to a debtor named Marie Brunner who had filed for bankruptcy less than a year after completing a master’s degree. The Second Circuit adopted a three-part framework for evaluating undue hardship that has since been adopted by most federal circuits (First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits variously apply Brunner or Brunner-derived tests).

Prong 1 — Cannot maintain minimal standard of living

The first prong asks whether the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the student loans. This is a present-tense analysis based on the debtor’s actual income and expenses at the time of the discharge proceeding. “Minimal standard of living” is not defined precisely but generally refers to a modest but adequate standard covering basic necessities — housing, food, transportation, healthcare, and other essential expenses. Analysis of the first prong typically involves detailed budget review showing income sources, essential expenses, and the resulting available income (or deficit) after essential expenses.

Prong 2 — Additional circumstances indicate persistence

The second prong asks whether additional circumstances exist that indicate the debtor’s current inability to repay is likely to persist for a significant portion of the loan repayment period. This prong requires the debtor to show that the current financial hardship is not just a temporary condition — it must reflect circumstances that indicate ongoing difficulty in repayment over the reasonably foreseeable future. Common circumstances that support the second prong include: chronic medical conditions that limit earning capacity, disabilities that impair the debtor’s ability to work, obligations to care for dependents with special needs, age-related factors reducing employment prospects, and structural changes in the debtor’s industry or profession that limit income potential.

Prong 3 — Good faith effort to repay

The third prong asks whether the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the student loans. This prong looks at the debtor’s history of interaction with the loans — payments made when possible, communications with servicers about hardship, applications for repayment plans (income-driven repayment, deferment, forbearance) or restructuring options, and generally whether the debtor has approached the loans in good faith rather than seeking to avoid repayment. Notably, the third prong does not require the debtor to have made every possible payment or to have paid substantial amounts — it requires good faith engagement with the repayment obligation given the debtor’s actual circumstances.

Application and burden of proof

In Brunner jurisdictions, the debtor bears the burden of proving all three prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. Failure to establish any one prong results in denial of the undue hardship discharge. The strict all-three-prongs structure has historically been the source of the reputation that Brunner is nearly impossible to satisfy — a debtor who meets prongs 1 and 2 but who has not made “sufficient” good faith efforts under prong 3 fails the entire test. In practice, however, decisions applying Brunner have varied substantially in how each prong is interpreted, with some courts applying more borrower-favorable interpretations than the strict formulation might suggest.

Totality of circumstances test — minority framework

The First and Eighth Circuits (and some bankruptcy courts within otherwise-Brunner circuits) apply an alternative “totality of the circumstances” test that considers the debtor’s overall financial situation without the rigid three-prong structure. Under this test, courts consider the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources, the debtor’s reasonable and necessary living expenses, and any other relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the ability to repay. The totality analysis is generally regarded as somewhat more borrower-favorable than Brunner because it does not require the debtor to satisfy each of three specific elements independently — a strong showing on some dimensions can compensate for weaker showings on others.

The specific framework applicable in a given case depends on the circuit in which the bankruptcy is filed and, within some circuits, on the specific bankruptcy court’s practice. Analysis of the applicable test is a jurisdiction-specific evaluation that must be conducted for each borrower’s specific situation. Where the borrower has flexibility in choice of jurisdiction (which may arise from residence changes or venue considerations), the choice of applicable framework can be a meaningful strategic consideration.

The adversary proceeding process

Discharge of student loans under §523(a)(8) is not automatic — the debtor must initiate an adversary proceeding within the bankruptcy case to seek a court order specifically discharging the student loan debt. The adversary proceeding is a separate lawsuit filed within the bankruptcy that follows procedures distinct from the general bankruptcy administration.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(6)

Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(6), a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt is an adversary proceeding — meaning it requires the filing of a complaint, service of process on the creditor, and a full contested proceeding subject to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Part VII (which incorporates many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The adversary proceeding is filed within the bankruptcy case but is procedurally distinct — it has its own docket, its own timeline, and its own motion practice.

Complaint and initial procedure

The adversary complaint identifies the specific student loans at issue, the creditors (typically the loan servicer or owner, potentially including cosigners’ rights as separately affected parties), and the specific relief sought. The complaint’s theory of dischargeability determines the analytical framework: (1) where the borrower alleges the loan does not fall within §523(a)(8) at all (for example, the Homaidan-type analysis that the loan is not an “educational benefit” under (A)(ii) and is not a qualified education loan under (B)), no undue hardship showing is required; (2) where the borrower alleges undue hardship under §523(a)(8), the complaint must plead facts supporting the Brunner or totality-of-circumstances elements as applicable.

Discovery, motions, and trial

After the answer, the adversary proceeding proceeds through discovery, pre-trial motions, and (if not resolved through summary judgment or settlement) trial before the bankruptcy judge. Discovery in adversary proceedings uses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporated through the Bankruptcy Rules — interrogatories, requests for production, requests for admission, and depositions are all available. For §523(a)(8) proceedings, discovery typically focuses on: (1) the loan documentation (promissory note, disclosures, school certifications of cost of attendance and enrollment status); (2) the chain of assignment if ownership is contested; (3) the debtor’s financial circumstances (for undue hardship cases); and (4) the debtor’s payment history and interactions with the loans (for good faith prong analysis).

Timing and cost considerations

Adversary proceedings add substantial time and cost to the bankruptcy process. A straightforward Chapter 7 bankruptcy typically closes within 3-6 months of filing; an adversary proceeding for student loan discharge can extend the case by 6-24 months depending on complexity, settlement negotiations, and trial requirements. Attorney fees for the adversary proceeding are separate from and additional to the general Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 attorney fees, though the specific fee structure depends on the attorney’s arrangement. Some bankruptcy attorneys handle adversary proceedings as part of their general representation; others require separate engagement or additional fees for adversary work. Evaluating the cost-benefit of the adversary proceeding requires comparing the anticipated adversary cost against the amount of debt at issue and the probability of successful discharge.

Ascent’s June 2023 waiver and lender-specific considerations

Beyond the general §523(a)(8) framework, several lender-specific considerations affect the practical dischargeability analysis for specific private student loans. Understanding the lender’s position on discharge — including any voluntary waivers of the undue hardship standard — is an essential input to the adversary proceeding strategy.

Ascent’s June 5, 2023 waiver

In materials distributed through the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA), Ascent Funding LLC (the San Diego-based private student loan originator that launched in 2016 and works through partner banks Bank of Lake Mills and DR Bank) announced that “Ascent college loans originated June 5, 2023 onwards are eligible for discharge without a showing of ‘undue hardship.'” This announcement, which is unique among major private student loan lenders, represents a voluntary waiver of the §523(a)(8) undue hardship requirement for Ascent’s post-June-5-2023 originations. Under the waiver, an Ascent borrower with a covered loan can seek discharge through the bankruptcy adversary proceeding without needing to prove the Brunner or totality-of-circumstances elements. The waiver applies only to Ascent-originated loans on or after June 5, 2023 — Ascent loans originated before that date remain subject to the standard §523(a)(8) analysis.

Ascent’s June 2023 waiver is notable because it demonstrates that industry practice on private student loan dischargeability is not fixed at the strict §523(a)(8) baseline — lenders can voluntarily waive the undue hardship standard for their own loans, and doing so is presented by Ascent as consistent with responsible lending practice. Whether other private student loan lenders will follow Ascent’s approach in future years remains to be seen, but the existence of the waiver establishes that “private student loans are non-dischargeable” is an overstatement even at the lender-policy level.

Other lender-specific considerations

Several lender-specific factors affect the practical analysis: (1) the Homaidan class action settlement of approximately $1.7 billion in cancelled Sallie Mae and Navient private student loans applied to specific categories of loans (excess-of-cost-of-attendance loans and non-Title-IV-institution loans), meaning that specific Sallie Mae or Navient loans may already have been cancelled or may fall within analogous categories; (2) SoFi’s structural bifurcation between the legacy SoFi Lending Corp. entity (loans transferred to Firstmark in Q1 2025) and the current SoFi Bank, N.A. entity (loans serviced by MOHELA) may affect the applicable analysis based on which entity holds the specific loan; (3) Discover’s July 2024 portfolio sale to Carlyle-KKR partnerships with servicing by Firstmark creates a similar analytical wrinkle for former Discover loans; (4) loans originated by Earnest Operations LLC (a Navient subsidiary since the 2017 acquisition) are subject to specific facts about the loan documentation and current holder; and (5) Citizens Bank private student loans and loans from other current originators are analyzed under the same §523(a)(8) framework with lender-specific documentation and current-holder analysis.

Integration with the full defense framework

Bankruptcy dischargeability analysis operates alongside — not in place of — the other defensive frameworks covered elsewhere in this series. For most borrowers, the effective defense strategy uses bankruptcy as one option among several rather than as the primary or exclusive pathway. FDCPA §1692g validation demands, TILA §1638(e) disclosure analysis, FCRA §1681i credit reporting disputes, arbitration clause analysis, chain-of-assignment challenges, state SOL analysis, and state consumer protection statute claims all operate independently of bankruptcy and may resolve the underlying debt without the cost, complexity, and credit impact of a bankruptcy filing. Where bankruptcy is the right pathway, the coordinated analysis with these other frameworks typically produces better outcomes than reliance on bankruptcy alone — for example, bankruptcy discharge combined with successful chain-of-assignment challenges may eliminate a debt more decisively than either pathway alone would achieve.

Common bankruptcy dischargeability myths

Frequently asked questions about private student loan bankruptcy discharge

Disclaimer: Informational content only. Not legal, tax, or financial advice. Henry Silva is a Private Student Loan Debt Specialist, not a licensed attorney, tax professional, or bankruptcy trustee. Private Student Relief is operated by Joco (555 Anton Blvd Suite 368, Costa Mesa CA 92626) and is a private student loan relief consulting organization — not a law firm, tax advisory firm, bankruptcy trustee, or affiliate of any private student loan lender, servicer, funding bank, or affiliated entity. Private Student Relief does not file bankruptcy petitions or represent borrowers in bankruptcy proceedings — bankruptcy filing requires a licensed bankruptcy attorney. We do not represent borrowers in litigation, provide legal representation of any kind, or execute bankruptcy adversary proceedings. We help borrowers coordinate with vetted attorney-backed partner provider services that execute FDCPA-compliant debt validation procedures under 15 U.S.C. §1692g. Ratings, BBB accreditation, AADR membership, and industry tenure referenced elsewhere on privatestudentrelief.com belong to our attorney-backed partner provider, not to Private Student Relief. Statutory, procedural, and case references summarized for educational purposes: federal Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. §101 et seq including §523(a)(8) (exceptions from discharge for educational debt), §523(a)(8)(A)(i) (governmental unit and nonprofit program-funded loans), §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) (educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend obligations — substantially narrowed by Homaidan-McDaniel-Thomas circuit line), §523(a)(8)(B) (qualified education loans as defined in Internal Revenue Code §221(d)(1) — added by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005); Internal Revenue Code §221(d)(1) (qualified education loan definition, originally for student loan interest deduction eligibility); Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(6) (adversary proceeding requirement for dischargeability determinations); Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (three-prong undue hardship test — majority framework); Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 3 F.4th 595 (2d Cir. July 15, 2021) (private loans of ordinary consumer credit type not within §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) educational benefit category); McDaniel v. Navient Solutions, LLC (In re McDaniel), 973 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2020) (similar holding, Tenth Circuit); Thomas v. Department of Education (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2019) (initial breakthrough on educational benefit interpretation, Fifth Circuit); Homaidan v. Navient class action settlement (2022, approximately $1.7 billion in cancelled Sallie Mae and Navient private student loans for excess-of-cost-of-attendance loans and non-Title-IV-institution loans); Ascent Funding LLC June 5, 2023 waiver (distributed through National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators materials) applicable to Ascent college loans originated on or after June 5, 2023. Related statutory context: federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act at 15 U.S.C. §1692; federal Fair Credit Reporting Act at 15 U.S.C. §1681; federal Truth in Lending Act at 15 U.S.C. §1638(e); Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); Article III of the U.S. Constitution; state statutes of limitations vary by jurisdiction (NY CPLR §214-i 3-year post-CCFA, TX §16.004 4-year, PA §5525 4-year, OH §2305.06 6-year post-SB 13, GA §9-3-24 6-year, IL §13-206 10-year). Consult a currently-licensed bankruptcy attorney familiar with your specific situation and your specific circuit’s undue hardship framework for case-specific advice, particularly on §523(a)(8) analysis, adversary proceeding filing decisions, Brunner or totality-of-circumstances application, and integration of bankruptcy dischargeability with alternative defense pathways. Individual results vary based on specific loan facts, school certification records, current holder identification, applicable circuit framework, financial circumstances, and borrower circumstances. Private Student Relief serves 48 U.S. states — services are not available to residents of South Carolina or Mississippi. Last reviewed: August 2026.